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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is difficult, to handle simply as property, a creature possessing human 
passions and human feelings ... while on the other hand, the absolute 
necessity of dealing with property as a thing, greatly embarrasses a man 
in any attempt to treat it as a person.1 
—Frederick Law Olmsted, traveling in the American South before the 
Civil War 
This paper presents a simple argument: through a Dworkinian 
moral reading of the Constitution, nonhuman animals (“animals”)2 fall 
under the Supreme Court’s equal protection doctrinal framework for 
suspect classification. Therefore, nonhuman animals are protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The moral principle underlying equal 
protection is the ensuring of government’s empathetic and equitable 
treatment toward not just subgroups of humans (which have been 
judicially delineated by social constructs of race, gender, sexuality, and 
other defining characteristics), but toward all sentient beings who may 
become victim to the “tyranny of the majority.” 
Section II of this paper details the textual interpretation for 
considering animals to be constitutional persons. Section III engages 
with the Court’s modern equal protection doctrine and argues why 
animals meet the Court’s criteria for inclusion. Part IV considers the 
legal and political ramifications of including animals as a suspect class 
by examine the laws and regulations concerning the treatment of 
animals and analyzing if those laws and regulations withstand scrutiny. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 1 Steven M. Wise, Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals, 
http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/w/wise-cage.html. 
 2 See generally Delcianna J. Winders, Combining Reflexive Law and False 
Advertising to Standardize “Cruelty-Free” Labeling of Cosmetics, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV., 
454 (2006), http://www.animallaw.info/articles/art_ pdf/81nyulrev254.pdf  (noting  
humans are animals as well, and the reference of nonhuman animals as solely animals 
often can lead to the degradation of their moral worth). 
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Finally, Part V uses a realist approach to decipher why, due to a 
combination of speciesism and what Professor Kenji Yoshino calls 
“pluralism anxiety,” a mainstream court would not seriously consider 
constitutionally including animals in the near future. 
II. INTERPRETING THE CLAUSE 
A. TEXTUALISM, ORIGINALISM, AND “LEGAL PERSONS” 
The most obvious impediment to recognizing animals as a suspect 
class is the text of the Equal Protection Clause itself. Because the state 
cannot, “deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws,” there is a clear case to be made that the constitution does not 
include animals, as they are not ordinarily considered “people” or 
“persons.”3 Although some have argued that the term “person” should 
be read to indicate something close to “individuality” or 
“consciousness,” it is colloquially understood in the legal community to 
denote a human being.4 An originalist interpretation would be in accord 
with its textualist counterpart, as the drafters did not even include all 
biological humans in their idiosyncratic definition of “person,” let alone 
nonhuman animals.5 
Despite these methods of interpretation, the Court has not limited 
its application of constitutional principles to individual humans alone. 
The most prominent example of a nonhuman entity receiving Fourteenth 
Amendment protection is the corporation, a notorious legal fiction.6 
Corporations fail both methods of interpretations described above; 
textually, a corporation is obviously not a “person” in the literal sense, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added); (noting the term “persons” has 
been interpreted by the Court to be broader than “people”; see generally The 
Meaning(s) of “The People” in the Constitution, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1078 (2013), 
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol 126_the_people_in_the_ 
constitution.pdf. 
 4 See David Graver, Personal Bodies: A Corporeal Theory of Corporate 
Personhood, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 235, 244 (1999) (arguing that “[o]ne way 
to combat legal alienations of the body would be to refine the legal subject as an 
emobided consciousness”). 
 5 See Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV.  909, 986 (2009). 
 6 See generally Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and the Rights of 
Corporate Speech, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863 (2007), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1908& 
context=sulr. 
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and likewise the drafters did not intend to cover corporations in the 
reconstruction amendments.7 
Still, corporate personhood could be justified by the “nexus theory 
of contracts,” a term credited to economist Ronald Coase, which 
characterizes the corporation as a “nexus of explicit and implicit 
contracts establishing rights and obligations among the various inputs 
making up the firm.”8 The argument follows that because corporations 
are nothing more than the intersection of contractual obligations among 
individual persons, who themselves have rights, courts are justified in 
treating corporations as persons for constitutional analysis.9 Since 
animals do not have this trait of being comprised of individuals, one 
could argue this distinction makes corporate personhood permissible and 
animal personhood impermissible (or at least permits the former and 
leaves the latter ambiguous). 
It is very questionable, however, how much the underlying nexus 
theory holds up for our purposes. Importantly, the way in which 
corporations are comprised (pluralistically) differs rather starkly from 
the way in which they usually go about their societal business 
(individualistically).10 Simply put, the corporation typically acts as a 
monolithic force with its own personal set of rights, privileges, and 
liabilities, rather than just the collective will of a centralized group. At 
that point, it is the corporate entity itself that is treated as a “person,” not 
just an amalgamation of interrelated individual persons. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 7 See id.at 865, (contending  “[a]lthough corporations were widespread and well 
known at [the time the Fourteenth Amendment was added to the constitution], the 
Framers…did not intend to grand corporations these rights.”). 
 8 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of 
Contracts: A Critique of Gulati, Klein, & Kolt’s ‘Connected Contracts’ Model, UCLA 
School of Law, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=299743. 
 9 See Graver, supra note 4 at 239 (stating that proponents of this argument use 
the nexus theory “mainly to introduce freedom of contract arguments into discussions 
of the prerogatives of corporations and to argue for strict limits on state regulation of 
corporations”). 
 10 Id. at 240 (arguing that, “Whether the individuality of corporations is fictional 
or real, it is essential to their interaction with the world. The nexus-of-contracts theory 
fails to capture the importance of this individuality. Although this approach arguably 
may arguably present a more accurate picture of the actual foundation of the 
corporation, the theory fails to come to terms with the real world behavior of the 
corporations.”). 
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Moreover, the courts have long admitted to treating legal 
personhood as an amorphous term that can be shaped by considerations 
of pragmatic efficiency and notions of justice. In 1972, the New York 
Court of Appeals said: 
 
What is a legal person is for the law, including, of course, 
the Constitution…simply means that upon according legal 
personality to a thing the law affords it the rights and 
privileges of a legal person…[It] is a policy determination 
whether legal personality should attach and not a question 
of biological or ‘natural’ correspondence.11 
When the judiciary admits its own authorship in crafting the 
fictional narrative of legal personhood, whether animals can be read into 
the Fourteenth Amendment through textualism is a question of 
normativity rather than a quasi-technical method of statutory 
interpretation. Still, normative concerns are not the only way to include 
animals under equal protection. For example, the moral reading is a 
much simpler way. 
B. MORAL READING 
The “moral reading,” was famously advanced by Professor Ronald 
Dworkin. Dworkin says the method “proposes that we all—judges, 
lawyers, citizens—interpret and apply these abstract clauses on the 
understanding that they invoke moral principles about political decency 
and justice.”12 Dworkin argued, applying a given set of facts to a 
particular constitutional clause is not an algorithmic exercise and 
constitutional interpreters should treat themselves “like authors jointly 
creating a chain novel in which each writes a chapter that makes sense 
as part of the story as a whole.”13 Dworkin advises the consideration of 
the moral principles the text is based on.14 Likewise, Dworkin says 
playing guessing games about how the drafters would have dealt with 
“concrete cases” is not part of this analysis.15 Therefore, the fact that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 11 Byrn v. NYC Health &Hospitals Corp., 31 N.Y. 2d 194, 201(1972). 
 12 See Ronald Dworkin, The Moral Reading of the Constitution, THE NEW YORK 
REVIEW OF BOOKS, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1996/mar/21/the-moral-
reading-of-the-constitution/?pagination=false. 
 13 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 10 (Harvard University Press 1996). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
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authors of the Fourteenth Amendment would not have considered 
animals as being covered by it is irrelevant for our purposes. 
My contention is that, given the societal internalization of the 
horrors of slavery which fashioned the text of the reconstruction 
amendments, the moral principle underlying the equal protection clause 
is fundamentally a check on government. Similarly, those that 
overemphasize differences between the oppressed rather than focus on 
the immorality of the oppressor are simply engaging in diversionary 
tactics. The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to ensure 
that government would provide “equal moral and political status” to “all 
those subject to its dominion.”16 
Because the modern equal protection doctrine has become nuanced, 
typically obsessing over levels of scrutiny and the exact wording of 
laws, it is easy to forget that the clause has always had its finger 
squarely pointed at state action above all else.17 This confusion is 
compounded by the fact that, even as far as constitutional amendments 
go, the text of the Equal Protection Clause is incredibly vague.18 But 
most research into the congressional debates surrounding the clause’s 
adoption indicate that it was meant to prevent the state from both 
unequally administering laws and crafting laws that were substantively 
unequal.19 By providing a federal constitutional redress, the framers 
attempted to prevent the former Confederate states from systematically 
constructing a de facto mirror of the pre-Civil War society.20 
Of note here is that the reasons underlying the clause’s inclusion 
were to check government from using its coercive and tentacular power 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 16 Id. at 7-8; (noting the term “political” to mean “related to the ecosystemic 
polity,” which is intimately tied to the relationship between government and its sentient 
constituents, rather than something suggesting that since animals cannot themselves 
practically engage in the political landscape (i.e. “goats can vote”), they are excluded 
from consideration under this term). 
 17 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (U.S. 1886) (finding that non-citizens 
are not excluded from equal protection since, “the equal protection of the laws is a 
pledge of the protection of equal laws.”). 
 18 See generally John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, 101 YALE L. J. 524 (2005). 
 19 See id. at 1450; Harrison believes that the framers meant to limit the clause in 
each way. Administratively, to laws that were meant to protect, and substantively, to 
laws that were of “fundamental importance.” Under, Harrison’s view, suffrage would 
not even be protected by the clause. This view is far out of line with modern doctrine. 
 20 Id. 
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to harm minority groups. Although modern equal protection doctrine 
seems far removed from these historical underpinnings, this moral 
principle is still routinely applied today. Even the oft-criticized case of 
Washington v. Davis, in which the Court held that the discriminatory 
purpose of a law is paramount to its adverse impacts, pinpointed the 
malicious intent of the state as the ultimate factor of analysis, which is 
reminiscent of the ills the clause’s framers intended to curb.21 
C. WHY SENTIENCE IS THE STANDARD 
At this point, a potential response that is analytically similar to but 
subtly distinct from the argument that animals are not legal persons, is 
the Equal Protection Clause’s moral principle applies to biological 
humans exclusively. Thus, even if the primary intent behind the 
principle truly is a fundamental check on government power, the thesis 
of this article fails under a moral reading because it concerns nonhuman 
animals. 
I contend that the principle at hand is primarily concerned with the 
moral respect for beings inhabiting sentience or consciousness than with 
distinctions based on binomial nomenclature. Using sentience, the 
“capab[ility] of experiencing pain and suffering,”22 as a general standard 
for granting moral equality is immensely problematic given that it is 
anthropocentric, which often relates dignity with cognitive 
characteristics of biological humans.23 However, interpreting text 
through a moral reading is not about normativity, or what we would 
ideally like the standard to be, but it is about pinpointing the standard 
the framers created in their moral principle.24 Given the time and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 21 See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (U.S. 1976). 
 22 See Gary L. Francione, Taking Sentience Seriously, 1 J. ANIMAL LAW & ETHICS 
1, 5 (2006). 
 23 See Taimie L. Bryant, Sacrificing the Sacrifice of Animals: Legal Personhood 
for Animals, The Status of Animals as Property, and the Presumed Primacy of Humans, 
39 RUTGERS L. REV. 247, 269 (2008), 
http://lawjournal.rutgers.edu/sites/lawjournal.rutgers.edu/files/issues/v 39/2/02 
BryantVol39.2.r_1.pdf (arguing that, “When animal advocates buy into the game of 
identifying which animals are worthy of moral consideration by virtue of cognitive 
capacity, sentience or multiple capacities, they further entrench the view that what 
humans want and what humans define as important constitute the field of moral 
consideration”). 
 24 DWORKIN, Supra note 13, at 11 (arguing that “The moral reading…does not ask 
[judges] to follow the whisperings of their own consiences or the traditions of their own 
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circumstances, the reconstruction drafters were broadly egalitarian in 
their respect for equality when drafting the Fourteenth Amendment, but 
to think they would have gone even further than sentience due to 
concerns over speciesism is to impose an overly progressive a mindset. 
Rights are often seen as intrinsic, transcending our supposed 
limited politics and entering the realm of something bestowed by a 
higher power. Therefore, it is easy to see how subjective views on the 
true meaning, and intersection, of “nature” and “rights”, can become a 
game in which those groups with political power seek to frame the rights 
at hand as being inherently limited to the dominant class due to some 
external “fact” about the “true nature” of humanity.25 This is a version of 
quasi-religious and antiscientific speciesism that seeks to affirm bigotry 
by appealing to some vague notion of the structure of the species.26 
When the Fourteenth Amendment was introduced to the Senate for 
discussion in 1866, Sen. Reverdy Johnson (D. Md.) questioned whether 
females would be included under the definition of “persons” with 
reference to the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Senator Jacob Howard 
(R. Mich.), who had earlier referenced James Madison when discussing 
whom should be granted suffrage under the Clause, combined a 
Dworkinian reading of Madison with a sexist limitation on voting in the 
context of natural rights: 
I believe Mr. Madison was old enough and wise enough to take it 
for granted there was such a thing as the law of nature…and by that law 
women and children are not regarded as equals of men… [Madison] lays 
down a broad democratic principle, that those who are bound by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
class or sect if these cannot be seen as embedded in [the broad story of America’s 
historical record].”). 
 25 See PETER SINGER, Ethics Beyond Species and Beyond Instincts: A Response to 
Richard Posner, ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 78-79 
(CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, 2006) (discussing slavery and the lower 
legal status of women: “As these examples show, the fact that a view is widespread 
does not make it right. It may be an indefensible prejudice that survives primarily 
because it suits the interests of the dominant group.”). 
 26 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (U.S. 1967) (noting the trial judge in the case 
that eventually became which struck down interracial marriage bans on Fourteenth 
Amendment grounds) stated that, “‘Almighty God created the races white, black, 
yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the 
interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact 
that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.’”). 
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laws ought to have a voice in making them; and everywhere mature 
manhood is the representative type of the human race.27 
This is an appropriate example for why Dworkin contends we 
extract the moral principle while leaving behind the views of its 
originators on how the principle applies to specific cases. Howard’s 
interpretation of Madison’s principle, “that those who are bound by the 
law ought to have a voice in making them,” is fairly consistent with 
current Supreme Court doctrine on the extension of suffrage and would 
most likely apply to animals. But because societal norms are constantly 
changing, textual interpretation requires judges to evaluate the text in 
light of current morality, and not the time in which the principle was 
enacted.28 Therefore, the fact that the framers did not consider women to 
be protected under the reconstruction amendments does not mean we 
ignore the moral principle at hand. 
Still, it is clear that the amendments’ drafters intended a framework 
that was simply paradoxical to their sexism and racism: concern for state 
discrimination that could lead to the suffering of vulnerable groups. But 
because they viewed the white male as the incarnation of human 
excellence, and thus intended to use the Equal Protection Clause to 
compassionately recognize in other races the qualities they deemed to be 
most important in humanity at large, their rationale was similar to what 
The Great Ape Project (“GAP”) calls the “similar-minds” approach. 
Under the GAP approach, the recognition of rights in others is 
predicated on the others’ having cognitive traits similar to the group in 
charge of granting political or moral equality.29 
The question then becomes whether to interpret the framers’ 
similar-minds approach narrowly or broadly, or how “close” did another 
being need to be to them. Another question is, how many of the 
cognitive functions must they have shared with the white male, in order 
to be included under the purview of the clause? Many drafters 
considering equal protection (and the reconstruction amendments at 
large) to be the recognition of moral equality in blacks by ensuring, at 
least at some minimum level, structural political equality to a group they 
believed were, based on “scientific proof” of racially inferiority. 30 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 27 See Boyce, supra note 5. 
 28 See generally Dworkin supra note 12 (arguing that antiquated and absurd 
results stemming from strict originalism render it fatal). 
 29 Bryant, Supra note 23, at 5-7. 
 30 See Keith E. Sealing, Blood Will Tell: Scientific Racism and the Legal 
Prohibitions Against Miscegenation, 5 Mich. J. Race & L., 559, 589 (2000) (finding 
that “The debates over the Reconstruction amendments not only indicated concern over 
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However, the drafters did not intend a daunting “shared minds” 
standard, but were willing to recognize moral equality in others whom 
they did not believe were true biological equals. 
Importantly, it is usually not until one group peacefully welcomes a 
culturally or ethnically distinct faction into its moral community that the 
group even views the faction as being biological equals. For example, 
Professor Dale Jamieson explains: 
 
[I]t is interesting to note that perception of difference often 
shifts once moral equality is recognized. Before 
emancipation (and still among some confirmed racists) 
American blacks were often perceived as more like apes or 
monkeys than like Caucasian humans. Once moral equality 
was admitted, perceptions of identity and difference began 
to change. Increasingly blacks came to be viewed as part of 
the “human family”, all of whose members are regarded as 
qualitatively different from “mere animals”.31 
A potential response here is that blacks are biological equals to 
whites, such that the racism of the drafters should not be used as a 
means to extend political protection to animals. The key difference 
though is that when trying to decipher the preciseness of the moral 
principle at hand, we do look to the intent of the principle’s authors, 
which clearly was a retrograde (but somewhat progressive for its time) 
attempt at empathy. Sentience is important because it was, in the eyes of 
the drafters, a common denominator between the white males who 
drafted the clause and the blacks they sought to protect. Although many 
of the drafters did not consider the races to be biological equals, the 
Fourteenth Amendment was nonetheless an attempt to protect what the 
white males considered to be a lesser biological being. 
Racism is intricately tied to speciesism because it often attempts to 
make unscientific arguments about the nature of races that contains an 
implicit and white-dominated hierarchy. The Equal Protection Clause 
was even interpreted shortly after its induction in a manner indicative of 
white superiority. In a case before a Texas Circuit Court in 1879, a 
white man was sent to jail for five years for marrying a black woman.32 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the danger that race mixing would result from equality, but also featured scientific 
proof of black inferiority.”). 
 31 DALE JAMIESON, MORALITY’S PROGRESS 49 ( 2002). 
 32 See generally Ex parte Francois, 9 F. Cas. 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1879). 
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Such a statute would be clearly unconstitutional post-Loving, but at the 
time statutory bans on interracial marriages were widely accepted as 
being intra vires of equal protection.33 However, the court considered 
whether the fact that the statute punished whites alone for marrying 
blacks, and not vice versa, made it unconstitutional.34 The court found 
the law withstood the challenge: 
 
As respects intermarriage between the white and black 
races, it is very certain that such a connection would rarely 
occur but for the influence of the former over the later—an 
influence resulting from the superior education and 
intelligence of the whites, and the subordinate position so 
long held by the colored race. For such unnatural 
marriages, the whites are mainly to blame, and this may 
furnish some excuse, if not a justification, for punishing 
them alone, as a means of prevention.35 
The court treated the miscegenation law as if it were a bestiality 
statute: punishing the creature who lacks the ability to refuse consent, 
due to the “superior education and intelligence” of whites, would be 
foolhardy. Instead, it makes perfect sense to punish the party to blame, 
as “a means of prevention” because criminal law deterrence theory was 
seen to be ineffective to the subordinate race. Again, this degradation of 
blacks as being “subhuman” should not come as shocking. Indeed, 
because miscegenation is a relatively unique nexus of societal 
phenomena regarding race and biology, it can be an important vehicle 
for analyzing the link between speciesism and racism.36 Catherine 
MacKinnon has compared bestiality statutes to miscegenation bans: “On 
the race and gender axes, interracial sex for white women was treated as 
bestiality for white men, both in their unnaturalness and in the forfeiting 
of moral superiority and privileged status for the dominant group 
member.”37 
Finally, we should be aware that the term used by the framers was 
“persons,” and not something more biologically specific, like “human 
being. The legal system recognizes the principle behind this distinction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. (noting the court thought the reverse would clearly violate the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875). 
 35 Id. at 70. 
 36 See generally Sealing, supra note 30. 
 37 CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, OF MICE AND MEN: A FEMINIST FRAGMENT ON 
ANIMAL RIGHTS 275 (2004). 
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(a form of the expressio unius canon of interpretation) when it comes to 
not limiting equal protection to citizens alone.38 It could be seen as a 
purposeful attempt by the framers to use as a broad term so that those 
who sought to wreak havoc in a way contrary to the intent of the 
amendment could not try to point to the noun as being descriptively 
limiting. 
D. THE SIDE OF CAUTION APPROACH 
Despite its ability to appear rigidly technical, textual interpretation 
is not a formulaically objective method; the entire process is shaped by 
rules or canons popularly used by judges that are often premised on 
normative notions of justice.39 For example, the rule of lenity is a canon 
used in criminal defense cases that demands judges interpret statutory 
ambiguities in a light favorable to the defendant.40 The reasoning behind 
this interpretation is not based on an originalist or textualist argument, 
since the rule transcends individual analysis. The courts have instead 
justified lenity on the grounds that it forces legislatures to be specific 
when they attempt to incarcerate (rather than drafting broad statutes and 
having the judiciary de facto legislate from the bench).41 Thus, the rule 
of lenity is based on value judgments regarding, fundamentally, how we 
should treat fellow people.42 
Courts may also be wise to err on the side of caution when they 
interpret whether or not a group meets constitutional (or legal) 
personhood; this would mean a judge lean toward inclusion rather than 
exclusion at the point in which clarity on the issue is lacking. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 38 See generally Neal Kaytal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
1365 (2007). 
 39 See generally Jonathan R. Macey (with Geoffrey Miller), The Canons of 
Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647 (1992). 
 40 See generally Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 885 (2004). 
 41 See generally U.S. v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (U.S. 1971). 
 42 See generally Peter K. Westen, Two Rules of Legality in Criminal Law, 26 L. & 
PHIL. (2007) (arguing that the rule of lenity “derives from a principle of culpability that 
also underlies the presumption of innocence – the only difference between that the 
presumption of innocence is a preference for acquittal in the event of uncertainty 
regarding the facts with which an actor is charged, while the [rule of lenity] is an 
analogous preference for acquittal in the event of uncertainty regarding the scope of the 
law with which he is charged.”). 
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principle is similar to the notions of justice underlying the rule of lenity: 
when a certain group sits before the judgment of society and the case is 
unclear either way: compassion is preferable. 
This point is especially acute in the context of applying animals to 
the equal protection clause. Inclusion would simply mean the 
recognition of animals when we create laws that single out and affect 
them; the harms of “improper” inclusion would be infidelity to the text 
of the clause (in the form of over-inclusion) and any negative 
externalities to the human population from the inability to properly 
exploit animals. Exclusion would mean a continuation of the status quo 
whereby animals are only statutorily protected, relying on legislation to 
ensure recognition; the harms of “improper” exclusion would be 
infidelity to the text (in the form of under-inclusion) and illegitimate 
discrimination resulting in concrete harms to animals. 
Even if one were unclear as to whether the framers intended a 
broad or narrow similar-minds approach, or whether a pragmatic reading 
of constitutional personhood weighed in favor or against the inclusion of 
animals, an approach that erred on the side of caution would allow for 
inclusion at the point of this ambiguity. The Equal Protection Clause 
was interested in limiting government power above all else, a high bar 
should be set in order to exclude a group, rather than shifting the burden 
onto the group to demonstrate why they should be included. 
III. ANIMALS AS SUSPECT CLASS 
In order to determine what level of scrutiny a court is likely to give 
to a law that facially discriminates against animals, we can rely on 
precedent and judicially-crafted standards.  Under rational basis review, 
the Court will ask for any rational government interest as a 
constitutionally permissible reason to discriminate.43 Under intermediate 
scrutiny, currently applied to discrimination based on gender, the Court 
will ask if the law is substantially related to an important government 
purpose.44 Finally, strict scrutiny is applied to discrimination based on 
race and demands that the law be narrowly tailored to a compelling 
government interest; strict scrutiny is famously described as being “fatal 
in fact” because the Supreme Court almost always strike down statutes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 43 See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 
481 (2004). 
 44 Id. 
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under strict scrutiny.45 The exact method used by the Court to put a 
group in a scrutiny category has never been articulated to specificity, but 
certain factors have been commonly used and their analytical 
underpinnings frequently overlap.46 
A. DISCRETENESS/INSULARITY 
The factors of a group’s discreteness and insularity come straight 
from Carolene Products’ Footnote Four, where Justice Stone stated that 
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition…curtail[ing] the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for 
a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”47 The Court’s 
guidance on what exactly this standard calls for can be generously 
described as ‘wanting.’ Like much of equal protection doctrine, the 
exact criteria to look at and the definition of those standards are fuzzy.48 
Professor Yoshino tends to view ‘insularity’ and ‘discreteness’ as 
elements of a group’s “visibility” in the sociopolitical community; 
importantly, he believes the terms have been basically subsumed by 
other searching factors used by the court.49 
Still, even a cursory glance at the application of nonhuman animals 
to the vague definitions of these standards would prove promising for 
suspect classification. Animals are isolated in many ways: often 
geographically, almost always linguistically, and most importantly, 
speciestically, which drives an anthropocentric conceptualization of 
animals that makes them inherently insular and discrete. 
B. HISTORY OF DISCRIMINATION 
One factor that has been central to the Court’s suspect classification 
analysis is the history of discrimination against a group.50 In order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144. 
 48 See generally Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135 (2011). 
 49 See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility 
Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485 (1998). 
 50 See generally Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (U.S. 1985). 
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even have a prima facie claim for an equal protection violation, a 
government action must discriminate.51 However, the Court considers 
this “discriminating” to simply mean a statutory reference to a particular 
group, with no substantive analysis applied other than the first step of 
deciding if the government action does indeed pick out a particular 
group for special treatment. Meanwhile, the “history of discrimination” 
standard seems to be much more concerned with discrimination against 
a group in a way that proactively harms it, rather than legislation that 
simply references it. Therefore, the fact that thousands and thousands of 
laws have been drafted that reference and implicate nonhuman animals, 
with federal agencies created that do so as well, would not satisfy a 
“history of discrimination.” Something more pernicious is required. 
Carolene Products articulated that a core purpose of equal 
protection is the judiciary’s role in ensuring visibility to groups whom 
the political process has left for naught so a history of discrimination is 
often a straightforward evidentiary indicator of a group’s vulnerability. 
Courts have sometimes conceptualized this prong by asking a group to 
analogize their history of discrimination to that of women or blacks.52 
Despite this conceptualization being unfair and potentially limiting, it 
seems impossible to deny a history of discrimination against animals 
without relying on extreme euphemisms for the ways in which humans 
have treated them.53 Depending on the species, animals are treated 
vastly differently, making it somewhat difficult to generalize. For 
example, dogs are relatively favored in contemporary American culture 
and statutes, but farm animals are not.54 Unfortunately, unless the Court 
is willing to engage in a more granular species-by-species analysis, a 
broad category is the hand we are being dealt. 
Animals have suffered tremendously throughout American history 
due to discrimination, and their maltreatment continues today. This 
discrimination is not incidental to their being animals, but because they 
are animals. The legal community’s neurotic obsession over intent, this 
distinction is potentially important.55 Animals are used in cruel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 51 Id. 
 52 See Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 498 (U.S. 1976). 
 53 It is unclear whether “history of discrimination” transcends American history, 
so the geographical and temporal boundaries are iffy. 
 54 See generally Lewis Bollard, Ag-Gag: The Unconstitutionality of Laws 
Restricting Undercover Investigations on Farms, 42 ELR 10960, 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf /News_&_Events/BollardLewis2012Hogan-
SmogerEssayContestWinner.pdf. 
 55 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 229. 
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laboratory experimentation with little regard for their well-being.56 We 
allow for the process of factory farming that subjects animals to 
inhumane conditions we would never allow humans or even 
domesticated pets to undergo.57 Zoos, despite being seen by many as an 
ethical and compassionate form of entertainment, cause suffering in 
many different species.58 Animals are classified as property, a speciesist 
subjugation.59 Laws banning merciless torture of animals were only 
banned at the end of the eighteenth century and were full of loopholes 
that in actuality only forbade the most sadistic and depraved acts.60 
Finally, and most obviously, we allow for animals to be killed en masse 
and eaten by humans.61 This is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of 
discrimination against animals, and only includes practices with a 
deliberate intent on behalf of humans, but even a lower scienter 
requirement such as “wanton negligence” would cover vast more 
disturbing practices.62 
Despite analytical problems with analogizing the discrimination 
against animals to that of blacks and women, the hurdle is not 
insurmountable. Steven M. Wise has compared the status quo property 
status of animals as extremely similar to the practice of human slavery: 
 
Some may shift uncomfortably at comparisons between 
human and nonhuman slavery. They shouldn’t. The first 
definition of slave in the Oxford English Dictionary is “one 
who is the property of, and entirely subject to, another 
person, whether by capture, purchase, or birth…” Legal 
scholar Roscoe Pound said that, in Rome, a slave was “was 
a thing, and as such, like animals could be the object of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 56 See RICHARD D. RYDER, Speciesism in the Laboratory, IN DEFENSE OF 
ANIMALS 91 (2006). 
 57 See JIM MASON & MARY FINELLI, Brave New Farm?, IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 
104-106 (2006). 
 58 See DALE JAMIESON, Against Zoos, IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 141 (2006). 
 59 See generally Singer, supra note 25. 
 60 See id. at 53. 
 61 See id. at 9. 
 62 See Global Warming and Polar Bears, NATIONAL WILDLIFE FOUNDATION, 
http://www.nwf.org/Wildlife/Threats-to-Wildlife/Global-Warming/Effects-on-Wildlife-
and-Habitat/Polar-Bears.aspx (noting For example, humans do not contribute to climate 
change in order to harm animals, but their level of neglect and the subsequently causal 
ramifications of that neglect make the distinction between extreme negligence and 
specific intent specious at best). 
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rights of property.” Rome’s initial regulation of the 
treatment of slaves “took the same form as our legislation 
for the protection of animals. The master might be 
punished criminally for abuse of his powers, but the slave 
could not himself invoke the protection of the law.” This 
was true in slaveholding Virginia [and] Mississippi.63 
This comparison is also important in an integral regard: if the Court 
is asking for discriminatory practices analogous to those against blacks, 
slavery is not only the most analytically similar analogy one could 
possibly ask for, but also should be a sufficient condition to meet the 
history of discrimination criterion given that the Court has asked far less 
from other groups.64 
Discrimination against animals can also be properly analogized to 
discrimination against women. As MacKinnon has argued: 
 
[T]he ordering of humans over animals appears largely 
retraced within the human  group at the male-female line, 
which retraces the person-thing dichotomy, to the detriment 
of animals and women…Comparing humans’ treatment of 
animals with  men’s treatment of women illuminates 
the way the legal system’s response to animals is gendered, 
highlighting it’s response to women’s inequality to men as 
well. How animals are treated like women, and women like 
animals, and both like things, are interrogated in search of 
reciprocal light.65 
The social hierarchy that placed the masculine gender at the top 
predicated its misogyny on the ability to treat women as “things.”66 This 
degradation to the moral worth of the inanimate is a phenomenon the 
animal rights movement knows all too well. Besides being a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 63 See STEVEN M. WISE, Animal Rights, One Step at a Time, ANIMAL RIGHTS: 
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 22 (CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, 2006). 
 64 See Cleburne, 473 U.S at 432 (noting mentally retarded met the history of 
discrimination standard because of zoning ordinances that excluded the “feeble-
minded.” The Court also used a more facially broad standard than “history of 
discrimination,” calling it the “history of purposeful unequal treatment.”). 
 65 See MACKINNON, supra note 37 at 263. 
 66 Id. (arguing that, “[B]oth animals and women have been socially configured as 
property (as has been widely observed), specifically for possession and use.”). 
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conceptualization that permeates society, the idea also finds itself 
squarely within the courtroom itself.67 
However, the Court may not buy the slavery or sexism analogies, 
choosing instead to scoff at some detected extremism inherent in them, 
which is an ironic response given that the Court is specifically asking for 
such analogies to be drawn.68 It may argue that the property status of 
animals is not actually a subjugation, but rather just some sort of 
“natural ordering” based on “how things are,” completely distinct from 
the enslavement of blacks which was immoral and unnatural because of 
their biological equality to whites. This would be nothing more than a 
speciesist restructuring of the biological hierarchy from that of the 
slavery era: at that time the white male was dominant in the hierarchy 
with blacks and women considered inferior species. Today, the Court 
may bring all biological humans together at the top of the hierarchy in 
order to provide a more clearly delineated ordering resembling the 
colloquial “food chain,” which is considered in the mainstream to be 
“natural,” and thus, moral.69 Richard Epstein makes this exact argument, 
stating that: 
[T]he great impetus of the reform movement lay in the 
simple fact that the individuals who were consigned to 
subordinate status had roughly the same natural, that is 
human, capacities as those individuals in a privileged legal 
position. We still think in categories, but now all human 
beings are in one legal category; animals fall into 
another…It follows therefore that we should resist any 
effort to extrapolate legal rights for animals from the 
change in legal rights for women and slaves. There is no 
logical step to restore parity between animals on the one 
hand and women and slaves on the other. Historically, the 
elimination, first of slavery and then of civil disabilities to 
women, occurred long before the current agitation for 
animal rights. What is more, the natural cognitive and 
emotional limitations of animals, even the higher animals, 
preclude any creation of full parity. What animal can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 67 See Wise, supra note 1 (“I was powerless to represent [animals] directly. They 
were things, not persons, ignored by judges”). 
 68 Beef Industry Media Analysis, BEEF.ORG, 
http://www.beef.org/uDocs/mediaanalysis393.pdf (noting PETA received negative 
backlash when it attempted to compare the treatment of animals to slavery). 
 69 Theories on Animals and Ethics, UCONN HEALTH CENTER, 
http://acc.uchc.edu/ethics/theories.html. 
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given the right to contract? To testify in court? To vote? To 
participate in political deliberation? To worship70 
There are immense problems with Epstein’s analysis. To begin, he 
endorses the view that the abolitionist movement differed from today’s 
animal rights movement in that abolitionism dealt with human beings; 
he then adds to this by saying that, temporally, abolitionism preceded 
the women’s suffrage movement, which itself preceded the animal rights 
movement.71 These arguments are astounding in that they are 
analytically devoid because they do nothing but descriptively state the 
players and timeframe of the analogy. To argue that “humans are 
humans” and “animals are animals,” and, therefore, the analogy between 
the animal rights movement and slavery and/or women’s suffrage 
cannot be made is not only a naked tautology, but also once again ironic 
considering that analogizing demands that we compare unlike things. 
But Epstein’s line of thought devolves into just that very argument as he 
curtly states that humans fall into one legal position, and animals into 
another, which plays on our anthropocentric intuition as to the 
separation of the species. This conclusion is based on the fact that 
humans and animals are genetically different and assumed that 
difference demands that humans have a superior legal status. 
Epstein then finally tries to provide a warrant for his argument by 
revealing that, when it comes down to it, the “natural cognitive and 
emotional limitations of animals…preclude full parity” (note Epstein’s 
use of the word “natural” as a pseudo-religious appeal to authority.72 He 
then refers to the “higher animals,” implicitly (or possibly explicitly at 
this point) conjuring a speciesist hierarchy with humans placed firmly at 
the top, and, apparently, even the “higher up” animals do not meet the 
threshold for moral equality. Finally, he produces a list of absurd and 
ostensibly rhetorical questions that do nothing but inconsiderately mock 
the linguistic barriers between humans and animals that have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 70 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, Animals As Objects, Or Subjects, Of Rights 
151(2002). 
 71 This is an ex post historicism that engages in shoddy causality at best. Animal 
rights proponents existed concurrently with abolitionists, it was just that one group 
received political and moral equality before the other did. 
 72 See MACKINNON, supra note 37 at 264 (noting “The hierarchy of people over 
animals is not seen as imposed by humans because it is seen as due to animas’ innate 
inferiority by nature…Religious often rationalizes [this].”). 
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causal in the discrimination against nonhumans throughout history.73 
One can only imagine Professor Epstein walking up to a pig, asking it 
whether Lochner should be revived as commerce clause doctrine and 
receiving back nothing an oink, which would support the conclusion it is 
morally sound to slaughter the animal. 
This is one of three avenues, all distinct but intricately interrelated, 
that are commonly used by opponents of animal rights: an appeal to the 
status quo being divinely inspired by ecologically-obsessed deity.74 A 
second route, and a conceptual hurdle to checking off the history of 
discrimination criterion, is that the court may construe any negative 
behavior toward animals in this anthropocentric and euphemistic light, 
choosing to frame animal cruelty as some necessary paternalistic and 
symbiotic action on behalf of humans to maintain the natural order. The 
third path, argued by Richard Posner, is to frankly and honestly declare 
that discrimination is warranted because humans, in an extremely 
unsympathetic form of social Darwinism, must care for their species 
above all else.75 These rationalizations of discrimination make not only 
this analytical prong, but also the entire task of conceptualizing animal 
abuse, a difficult task. 
C. POLITICAL POWERLESSNESS 
Political powerlessness is related to a minority group’s insularity 
and history of discrimination because de jure discrimination would most 
likely not be possible if the group maintained sufficient political power. 
However, determining whether a group is politically powerless is more 
of an art than a science, given that there is no visible bright-line a court 
can look to for guidance (or even anything resembling a test articulated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 73 Francois, 9 F. Cas. at  699 (contending these very lines of questions are 
importantly ironic because they are premised on the same sorts of arguments denying 
women and blacks equal rights.; see also Chimps ‘trade’ just like humans, DAILY MAIL 
ONLINE (Dec. 18, 2011, 12:16 P.M.), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-
2071221/Chimps-trade-just-like-humans—indulge-oldest-profession.html  (contending 
animals actually can contract amongst themselves). 
 74 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 3. 
 75 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, Animal Rights: Legal, Philosophical, and 
Pragmatic Perspectives, ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 
78-79 (CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, 2006). 
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by the Supreme Court).76 In fact, the Court has never even indicated if 
the inquiry is best determined by a simple binary approach, asking if a 
group either does or does not maintain political power, or 
conceptualizing the issue on a continuum. However, we do know what 
the Court usually looks for to see if a group is politically powerless: 
legislation favorable to the group and politicians who are either allies of 
the group or members of it.77 
The political powerlessness of animals more than evident. First, 
they are completely disenfranchised due to linguistic barriers. Some may 
argue that they are derivatively represented by animal rights proponents, 
but this seems a lackluster form of democratic participation without real 
bite. Second, the empiricism is abundant with examples of harm toward 
animals, from inhumane slaughterhouses to cruel experimentation. An 
important distinction must be made here between how we approach 
these practices when analyzing respectively the history of discrimination 
toward animals and their political power. Under the history of 
discrimination standard, those opposed to animal equality can 
euphemize animal abuse to make it seem less morally problematic. 
However, even if some do not consider this adequately pernicious 
discrimination, it would be nonsensical to argue that, given a proper 
level of political power, animals would prefer or tolerate this 
arrangement. Thus, the fact that animals are taken from their homes and 
families against their will, put in horribly inhumane conditions, and 
eventually murdered and consumed, stands as some serious evidence of 
their political powerlessness. Third, even if animals themselves aren’t 
viewed negatively, animal proponents are. In a recent study, 30% of 
respondents thought unfavorably of vegans and 22% thought 
unfavorably of vegetarians.78 Gallup found that, “Vegetarianism in the 
U.S. remains quite uncommon and a lifestyle that is neither growing nor 
waning in popularity.”79 Only 5% of the population consider themselves 
vegetarian and only 2% consider themselves vegan.80 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 76 See Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinatti, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 
F.Supp 417, 437 (1994) (calling the Court’s political power test, “ill-defined.”). 
 77 Gary Segura Test. Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2013). 




 79 In U.S., 5% Consider Themselves Vegetarians, GALLUP (July 26, 2012), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/156215/consider-themselves-vegetarians.aspx. 
 80 Id. 
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Cutting against this line of reasoning are laws against animal 
cruelty. Richard Posner believes that rather than granting rights to 
animals, we should “extend, and more vigorously enforce, the laws that 
forbid inflicting gratuitous cruelty on animals.”81 For political power 
analysis purposes, laws against animal cruelty and abuse would seem to 
support the view that animals have adequate political power. But the fact 
that laws exist to prevent animal cruelty shouldn’t be considered some 
example of the societal clout animals wield, but instead prima facie 
evidence that there is a serious problem going on.82 There would not be 
a need for animal abuse statutes if an animal abuse problem did not exist 
in the first place. 
Animal abuse is not always criminalized and animal rights 
proponents are often targeted for their views. In fact, the meat industry’s 
lobbying power, has tried to push what is commonly called “Ag-Gag” 
legislation at the state level that would punish anyone who recorded 
animal abuse at animal enterprise facilities.83 Moreover, the Animal 
Enterprise Terrorism Act, which was rushed by a lame duck 
conservative congress in 2006 and quickly signed by President Bush, 
broadened the definition of domestic terrorism to include non-violent 
(although at time property-destroying) activities, specifically aimed at 
curtailing animal rights organizations.84 A review of the law argues that: 
 
While militant animal rights protectionists likely will 
continue destroying property to cause economic harm, they 
are unlikely to begin using deadly  violence like that 
occurring at the height of antiabortion extremism. Hence, 
the application of the terrorism label to animal rights 
extremist is inconsistent at best.85 
Societal hostility toward the animal rights movement, fueled in part 
by successful lobbying and campaigning by the meat industry, cannot be 
ignored in political power analysis. This hostility seeks to silence the 
human voices adopted by animals to support their rights and stands in 
the way of animals meaningfully participating in democracy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 81 POSNER, Supra note 75 at 59 
 82 Segura, Supra note 77. 
 83 See generally See Loving, 388 U.S. at  3. 
 84 See generally Dane Johnson, Cages, Clinics, and Consequences: The Chilling 
Problems of Controlling Special Interest Extremism, 86 OR. L. REV. 249 (2007). 
 85 Id. at 266. 
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D. ABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO SOCIETY 
The Court has also considered whether the defining trait being 
analyzed “bears [any] relation to the ability to perform or contribute to 
society.”86 When the defining trait affected the capacity to contribute, 
the court found equal protection was violated.87 This prong could be 
viewed as filler added in by the Court, but it could potentially stand in 
the way of suspect classification for animals. 
The phrase, contribution to society, is largely ambiguous. The 
phrase could just close the door on drug addicts, or it could mean that 
some sort of proactive, positive contribution is required. Although, the 
nonhumanity of nonhuman animals, does arguably affect an animal’s 
capacity to contribute to society in an important way. Indeed, it would 
be ironic to uphold a law legitimating the consumption of animals based 
on the argument that animals are not human because we couldn’t 
consume animals if they were human. 
The Court could attempt to reformulate the legal personhood 
argument as part of capacity to contribute analysis. It would say that 
since discrimination against animals is predicated on the differentiated 
species at hand, legislation affecting them is justified because it is 
related to their inability to contribute to society. This would be nothing 
more than a clever rephrasing of the argument that animals are simply 
not part of the “real” polity but are outside it.  Further, animals unable to 
sign the social contract, so animals are not entitled to protections under 
the law. These conclusions were illustrated in the holding of Dred Scott 
that blacks were not citizens so they lacked standing for a court to 
consider their moral worth.88 
E. IMMUTABILITY 
The immutability standard is the easiest prong to analyze for 
animals’ scrutiny status, but it also is one that should not be overlooked. 
The Court has articulated this standard as follows: 
 
[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable 
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 86 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (U.S. 1973). 
 87 See Ingrid M. Lofgren, The Role of Courts Vis-à-vis Legislatures in the Same-
Sex Marriage Context: Sexual Orientation as a Suspect Classification, 9 U. MD. L.J. 
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 213. 
 88 See generally Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (U.S. 1856). 
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the imposition of special disabilities upon members of a 
particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate 
‘the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should 
bear some relationship to individual responsibility….’89 
Applying this line of reasoning to animals, it would seem that 
imposing special disabilities to them because of their species would be 
just as unjust. Courts have chosen a relatively clear-cut path to interpret 
this standard: immutability is defined as a standalone concept, whereby 
the criterion is met simply if the defining characteristic of a group is 
unchangeable.90 This interpretation is a quick task for court because 
nonhuman animals cannot readily change their biology. It is possible 
that the Court may either try to downplay this criterion or lump it in with 
other factors that do not lie as much in animals’ favor (such as the 
capacity to contribute discussion above), but the overwhelming 
obviousness of the immutable characteristic that makes nonhuman 
animals nonhuman should be enough to please most courts. 
IV. LEGAL AND POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS 
The easiest way to fear monger the granting of moral equality to 
animals is through hyperbole. Epstein once stated that, “There would be 
nothing left of human society if we treated animals not as property but 
as independent holders of rights.”91 Drawing back to the slavery analogy 
earlier, these same sort of apocalyptic hysterics were echoed in the era 
immediately preceding the Civil War by pro-slavery Confederates.92 By 
playing on reflexive conservatives and risk aversion, opponents of 
animal rights completely overstate the ramifications of the constitutional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 89 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at  686. 
 90 See generally Susan R. Schmeiser, Changing the Immutable, 41. CONN. L. REV. 
1495 (2009). 
 91 See William Glaberson, Legal Pioneers Seek to Raise Lowly Status of Animals, 
THE NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 18, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/18/us/legal-
pioneers-seek-to-raise-lowly-status-of-animals.html?src=p. 
 92 See WISE supra note 63, at 21 (quoting the then future president of the College 
of William and Mary, Thomas Roderick Dew, as saying, “It is in the truth of the slave 
labour in Virginia which gives value to her soil and her habitations—take away this and 
you pull down the atlas that upholds the whole system—eject from the state the whole 
slave population…and the Old Dominion will be a ‘waste howling wilderness’—the 
grass shall be seen growing in the streets, and the foxes peeping from their holes”). 
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inclusion of animals. A better approach is to consider status quo 
practices that affect animals and hypothesize the level of scrutiny a court 
would apply to animals pursuant to a constitutional personhood 
approach. 
A. HUNTING/GAMING 
We can use a standard hunting regulation in an attempt to figure out 
how the Court would approach the issue based on current equal 
protection doctrine. 10 V.S.A. Section 4701 sets out some general 
provisions for hunting in Vermont: 
 
A person shall not take game except with a gun fired at 
arm’s length or with a bow and arrow, unless otherwise 
provided. A person shall not take game between one-half 
hour after sunset and one-half hour before sunrise unless 
otherwise provided. A person may take game and fur-
bearing animals during the open season, therefore, with the 
aid of a dog, unless otherwise prohibited.93 
Because this statute facially implicates animals, the first step in 
establishing an equal protection claim is met.94 At this point, the 
standard of review given to the statute becomes of immense importance. 
Under traditional rational basis review, the Court will accept almost 
any rationale proffered by the government unless it is wholly irrational 
or fueled by animus.95 Here the government can put forward plenty of 
arguments, none of which need be the actual reason the legislature relied 
on in passing the law. Justifications could include preserving the history 
of gaming as a pleasurable leisure activity in Vermont, preventing the 
overpopulation of certain species, the importance of gaming jobs to the 
Vermont economy, continuing the hunting-affected ecology of Vermont, 
and many more. The point to drive home is that under rational basis 
review, only the most pernicious, sadistic acts against animals would be 
considered too “irrational” to be constitutional. Most other mundane acts 
involving the death or harm to animals are still very likely to be upheld. 
Above rational basis is what is colloquially known as “rational 
basis with bite,” which is usually reserved for legislation affecting 
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homosexuals and functions extremely similarly to intermediate scrutiny, 
which itself requires that a law be substantially related to an important 
government purpose.96 The exact words used by the Court in these 
analyses is not as important as the level of scrutiny itself, which is 
strongly predictive of the outcome. For our purposes, the only difference 
between rational basis with bite, intermediate scrutiny, and strict 
scrutiny is the weight of the thumb on the scale given in favor of the 
government. In short, the thumb gets lighter as we go from rational basis 
to strict scrutiny. The key difference between rational basis and all other 
levels of scrutiny is that the Court is compelled to actually inquire into 
the rationales put forward by the government; a string of sentences with 
a few multisyllabic words will no longer be sufficient in itself. Once we 
reach the intermediate scrutiny stage, the loftier arguments tend to get 
weeded out by the court as focus shifts to the more legitimate 
justifications. For the Vermont statute, arguments relating to the 
economy, leisure activities, and overpopulation seem strongest. 
Hunting is a major economic windfall for Vermont; according to a 
2011 federal survey, both residents and nonresidents spent a combined 
$704.4 million on fish and wildlife recreation in the state (although the 
hunting and fishing portions would have to be severed from the 
spectator portions for a more specific figure).97 Because of Vermont’s 
vast wildlife and history of gaming, these numbers are, as a percentage, 
much higher than one would find in most states, so the Court may treat 
Vermont differently than, say, New Jersey.98 Animal proponents would 
stress that those displaced from the banning of hunting and fishing could 
find themselves in more productive areas of the economy, or can replace 
the killing of animals with charging people to only watch them. 
Proponents could also argue that the Court should not engage in an 
immoral “money for rights” trade off; this argument may have more 
salience because courts are often aware of the incommensurability 
between rights and money, and being courts, often times will opt for 
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rights.99 Still, it would not be too difficult for a court to emphasize 
people’s jobs and people’s livelihoods in order to implicitly tap into the 
speciest hierarchy and uphold any hunting ban. 
The same is true for the argument that hunting provides Vermonters 
with immense pleasure as a leisure activity. Any utility derived from 
hunting will have to be weighed against the harms to animals. Vermont 
again is a special case in which over a quarter of residents engage in 
hunting, fishing, or both.100 Proponents can respond that this recreation 
can be redirected toward wildlife watching, which fifty-three percent of 
residents claim to enjoy, the highest rate in the nation and over double 
the percentage of hunters.101 Moreover, banning hunting will open up 
more space and preserve more animals for wildlife watching. The 
government will respond by arguing that humans should be prioritized 
over nonhumans, which most likely will come down to the level of 
scrutiny at play. 
The government argument that hunting curbs overpopulation seems 
the most susceptible to being unacceptable by a court. Under strict 
scrutiny, the government action must be “narrowly tailored,” which 
means other means to achieve the societal goal have to have been 
considered and dismissed.102 Overpopulation can be achieved by much 
more humane means than hunting, which often time can be quite painful 
and cruel for animals, especially with a bow and arrow.103 The 
overpopulation argument would probably not be well taken under every 
standard of review aside from rational basis. 
Unless the Court takes a strong strict scrutiny approach, the 
Vermont hunting regulation will probably be deemed to not violate the 
equal protection clause. Economic and enjoyment justifications seem far 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 99 See generally Cass  R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994). 
 100 See Survey Reveals Vermont’s Fish and Wildlife are Important Recreationally 
and Economically, supra note 97. 
 101 Id. 
 102 See Goldberg, supra note 43. 
 103 See JOAN DUNAYER, ANIMAL EQUALITY 46-47 ( 2001), (“After a shot to the 
heart-lung area, bowhunters generally wait at least half an hour before tracking, to 
allow time for the wounded animal to die from blood loss. After a belly shot they wait 
eight to twelve hours. Animals who escape with lesser arrow wounds commonly die, 
over days or weeks, from painful bacterial infection…An animal shot anywhere other 
than the brain, heart, or major blood vessel endures prolonged suffering, especially if 
left wounded (as are an estimated one-fifth of white-tailed deer hit with shotgun slugs 
One hunter recalls a young buck shot in the spine. Bleating loudly, the buck dragged 
himself through the show by his forelegs. One of his hind legs dangled by a tendon.”). 
76 ENVIRONMENTAL AND EARTH LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6 
	  
removed enough from animus, and the pastime has enough historical 
and local significance, that the Court will not find the practice “cruel” 
enough to be struck down. 
B. COSMETIC ANIMAL TESTING 
Although using animals as test subjects for medicinal research is 
much more prevalent than using them for cosmetics, A court will likely 
not rule the former unconstitutional because human supremacy and risk 
aversion to the possibility of thwarting the progression of modern 
pharmaceutical methods are simply too great of obstacles to overcome. 
However, using animals for testing the safety of cosmetics is a 
much closer case. Rabbits are frequently used in what are called the 
Draize eye and skin irritancy tests.104 The procedures are explained as 
follows: 
The Draize eye irritancy test usually uses rabbits because 
they are docile, their eyes are much more sensitive than 
human eyes, and they are unable to tear, which can wash 
away the test substance. Typically, a young rabbit is tightly 
restrained in a box so that he is unable to move his neck or 
rub his eyes with his paws. Clips sometimes hold his 
eyelids open. Anesthesia is not generally administered. A 
researcher applies a concentrated substance to the outer 
layer of the eye—one of the most sensitive parts of the 
body—and observes it over a span of days or weeks for 
responses such as blindness, bleeding, hemorrhaging, and 
ulceration. For the skin irritancy test, a researcher shaves 
and often abrades a rabbit’s skin. To abrade the skin, 
adhesive tape is repeatedly applied and ripped off until 
several layers of skin are exposed. The researcher then 
applies a highly concentrated test substance to the raw area 
over a period of days or weeks and observes it for 
corrosion, weeping, inflammation, and other forms of 
irritation. At the end of both tests, the rabbits are generally 
killed.105 
If animals were considered constitutional persons, any legislation 
or regulation permitting these tests would be subject to judicial review. 
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Although rational basis is a typically a weak weapon to fight 
legislation, the Draize tests would certainly come close. The physical 
cruelty of the process can be analogized to animus against homosexuals 
that the Court struck down in Romer v. Evans.  Still, that case involved 
stripping the rights of human citizens, an action the Court ruled “lacks a 
rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”106 In this instance the 
state will be able to put forward a more ostensibly benign governmental 
objective: protecting the safety of humans. Rational basis will probably 
serve as a good enough shield in this instance. 
However, anything above rational basis should be enough to strike 
down the process for an important reason: higher levels of scrutiny 
demand that alternative means to achieve the same governmental 
objective be at least considered, and for cosmetic testing on rabbits they 
certainly have not been.107 While the presence of alternatives do not 
automatically render the law invalid, they certainly make the case for 
constitutionality less stable.108 Multiple alternative methods to the 
Draize tests are available and already used by major chemical 
companies.109 For example, the FDA has approved Corrositex, a protein 
membrane that serves as a perfectly acceptable replacement.110 While a 
comparison between the procedures would require the Court to involve 
itself in somewhat complicated scientific and cost-benefit analysis, it is 
part and parcel of the Court’s own test. 
Exactly how the Court would come out on cosmetic testing on 
animals is difficult to determine. It may view the many alternatives to 
the Draize tests as evidence that the means used are not substantially 
related to the governmental objective, or it could find the well-being of 
humans to be of such importance that a “whatever it takes” approach 
when it comes to animals is acceptable. This is an instance where the 
regulation may not withstand strict scrutiny, but gets upheld under 
everything else. 
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C. FACTORY FARMING 
The state of “factory farming,” whereby the meat industry turns 
nonhuman animals into corpses for consumption, is a sad one indeed. 
Over 300 million hens live in cages where they can barely move their 
wings.111 Calves prepared to become veal “are intensively confined and 
tethered in individual crates and stalls too narrow for them to turn 
around, let alone walk, during their entire 16-week lives before 
slaughter.112 Foie gras is made by “force-feed[ing] ducks and geese for 
weeks by shoving a metal pipe down their throats two or three times a 
day.”113 Cattle, who have incredibly sensitive skin, are “burned with a 
red-hot iron without receiving any anesthetic.”114 Unfortunately, these 
are not the exceptions but the norm. 
Any constitutional challenge to factory farming would most likely 
have to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, given that the different 
players and acts at hand in each unique situation. Still, we can take a 
holistic approach to how the Court is likely to view the issue. The 
governmental objective would likely be two-fold: the vitality of the meat 
industry (a staple of the American economy), and the ability for 
Americans to buy and consume meat products and low costs. 
This economic argument is a strong one: the meat and poultry 
industry constituted roughly 6% of the entire GDP of the United States 
in 2010.115 Whereas in the Vermont hunting statute we argued those 
displaced by the ban would find their way into other parts of the 
economy, a total of 487,600 Americans work annually in the meat or 
poultry processing industry.116 These numbers are hard to ignore, but 
animal rights proponents could argue that ending certain practices does 
not destroy the entire industry. Providing protections to nonhuman 
animals during the slaughtering process would impose costs on 
corporations that would most likely be either transferred in price to the 
consumers or paid for in lost jobs by workers. But given the success of 
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companies supporting “free range” and “organic” meat, it’s questionable 
just how costly this process would be to the meat industry. 
This issue will ultimately come down to how heinous the practice 
under review is and what experts say about the likely costs to the 
industry and consumers if the practice is struck down. It is unlikely that 
the entire carnivore industry being shut down under this scenario, 
certain practices that require minimal effort to prevent or alter (such as 
the branding of cattle sans anesthesia or the lack of cage space for hens) 
could be in trouble. 
V. WHY NOT NOW? 
In contrast to Epstein’s hyperbole, we can tell from the 
hypotheticals above that granting rights to animals would not bring 
about the end of the world. Even if their constitutional inclusion never 
struck down one law, it would at least serve a channeling function of 
indicating to humans that the interests of animals should be considered, 
which could lead to positive externalities elsewhere in the human-
nonhuman relationship. So why do I take the position that a mainstream 
court in the United States would never consider equal protection for 
animals in the near future? 
A. PLURALISM ANXIETY 
The first reason is what Professor Kenji Yoshino calls “pluralism” 
anxiety.”117 According to Yoshino: 
 
Our nation is increasingly beset with pluralism anxiety. 
Commentary from both the right and left has expressed the 
fear that we are fracturing into fiefs that do not speak with 
each other. That fear has a basis in fact, as the nation 
confronts “new” kinds of people…new newly visible 
people…This pluralism anxiety has transformed civil 
rights. As the number of groups in the public limelight has 
increased, so has anxiety about the group-based identity 
politics on which civil rights have historically been 
based…The jurisprudence of the United States Supreme 
Court reflects this pluralism anxiety. Over the past decades, 
the Court has systematically denied constitutional 
protection to new groups, curtailed it for already covered 
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groups, and limited Congress’s capacity to protect groups 
through civil rights legislation. The Court has repeatedly 
justified these limitations by adverting to pluralism anxiety. 
These cases signal the end of the equality doctrine as we 
have known it.118 
Pluralism anxiety is, at least for the moment, a death sentence to 
equal protection for animals. As Yoshino details, the Court feels 
overwhelmed by the immense amount of groups coming forward to 
claim equal protection. 
This “floodgates paranoia,” or the idea that if the Court continues 
its progression of equal protection doctrine every group known to man 
will stomp on the Court’s steps in Washington, D.C., huffing and 
puffing to break down the courthouse doors, is a serious harbinger to 
animal equality. It stands, moreover, as the ultimate example of this 
cartoonish judicial nightmare because it seems so facially ridiculous: an 
animal demanding for equal rights? 
However, this conservative reaction by the Court to simply close its 
doors rather than expand upon its original doctrine seems unsustainable. 
A plethora of minority groups do exist and are seeking political equality, 
and a temporary stubborn fit by the Court will not be enough to make 
these people go away. Most likely the Court will adapt as time moves on 
with suggestions such as the one Yoshino recommends (a shift from 
group-specific rights claims to encompassing and broad universal rights 
claims) or revive and enlarge the old doctrine. 
B. SPECIESISM 
As has been detailed throughout this paper, it is hard for 
mainstream courts to consider legal and moral claims on behalf of 
animals in a non-speciest mindset. This should not be surprising given 
how long it has taken to make even incremental progress in racism and 
sexism, but it also means that equal protection for animals may be many 
years away. For the most parts, speciesism is not the result of any overt 
hatred or mean-spirited animus toward animals, but instead a byproduct 
of how we conceptualize humans and nonhumans and the continuous 
societal notion of a species hierarchy. Until that changes, the arguments 
put forth by many anti-animal rights proponents that instead of granting 
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more proactive rights to animals we should enforce the negative rights 
we assign to them (e.g., preventing abuse and sadistic treatment) will 
most likely carry the day. 
Speciesism also comes in two separate waves when it comes to 
equal protection for animals. The first wave is whether or not they 
would be included, and secondly how the analysis is conducted once 
they are. As we saw in Section IV, even if we grant that animals are 
worthy of consideration, the way we view the human-nonhuman 
relationship (typically as symbiotically master-servant) would serve as a 
troublesome hurdle for the initial inclusion to actually have any practical 
effect. Joan Dunayer gives an example of this phenomenon in detailing 
how vivisections of animals are often reconceptualized as “sacrifices:” 
 
Vivesectors’ verbal dishonesty extends through their 
victims’ deaths. In their experiments, vivisectors don’t 
“kill” animals; they “produce lethality,” for example, by 
irradiating beagles who then die from widespread bacterial 
infection or hemorrhaging. Nonhuman animals killed by 
vivisection technicians are destroyed, put down, put to 
sleep, discarded, dispatched, disposed of, and terminated. 
They also “go into data.” Rooms of animals are 
“depopulated”—a process called “housecleaning.” All 
these terms euphemize. Destroy equates nonhuman beings 
with inanimate things. Used matter-of-factly rather than in 
objection, discard and dispose of reduce animals to dirt or 
trash. So does houseclean. Go into data removes human 
agency, absolving murderers of guilty…Vivisection’s 
victims literally are a blood sacrifice, killed for 
professional and financial gain and always-hypothetical 
public benefit. More a religion than a science, vivisection 
consists of ritual torture, animal sacrifice, and self-
worship.119 
It is in this matter that judges may view the mass murder of 
nonhuman animals, no matter the level of scrutiny given. If we are still 
thinking of the death of a nonhuman as the depletion of an inanimate 
thing, then we are still far away from moral equality. 
C. SENSITIVE RACE ANALOGIES 
Because the Fourteenth Amendment was originally ratified so as to 
be applied to the newly freed slaves, and because of racism that has been 
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predicated on comparing blacks to animals, the courts, even if 
sympathetic to animal rights generally, may find the connection between 
animals and equal protection unsettling. The reason this is ironic is that 
the moral takeaway of the Amendment entailed remembering the 
maltreatment of blacks in order to prevent history from repeating itself 
when it came to other vulnerable groups. To ignore the comparison out 
of fear of that specific salience is a curious way of doing justice to the 
clause itself. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is a strong argument to be made that animals should be 
included in a moral reading of the Fourteenth Amendment; they are 
sentient creatures that are seriously and drastically affected by the laws 
and regulations subject to judicial review. The argument that there is an 
implicit homo sapiens requirement to receive protection is inconsistent 
with the biological superiority that the white male drafters of the 
reconstruction amendments felt they held over blacks and women. The 
historical record is much more indicative of a “similar minds” approach 
on behalf of the drafters, who equated moral worth with anthropocentric 
cognitive capabilities. Nonhuman animals, if given constitutional 
protection, would most likely get suspect class status given the Supreme 
Court’s equal protection doctrine. Despite hyperboles reminiscent of the 
pre-Civil War abolitionist period, granting political rights to animals 
would not be the end of humanity and the exact effect would be unclear. 
Finally, the majority is beginning to feel overwhelmed by the sheer 
volume of minority groups asking for moral recognition. Based on 
historical and pervasive speciesism, the consideration of animals for 
equal protection purposes is a chapter that will eventually be written in 
the near future. 
 
